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Addiction, Choice and Criminal Law 
By 
Stephen J. Morse, J.D., Ph.D. 
University of Pennsylvania 
 
Introduction 
There is a debate among addiction specialists about the degree to which addicts 
can exert choice about seeking and using substances and about other behaviors related to 
addiction.  All agree, as they must, that seeking and using and related actions are human 
actions, but there the agreement largely ends.  Some, especially those who believe that 
addiction is a chronic and relapsing brain disease, think that seeking and using are solely 
or almost solely signs of a disease and that addicts have little choice about whether to 
seek and use.  In contrast are those who believe that seeking and using are constrained 
choices but considerably less constrained on average than the first group suggests.  This 
group is also more cautious about, but does not reject, characterizing addiction as a 
disorder.  There is evidence to support both positions.  There is a third group who believe 
that addiction is simply a consequence of moral weakness of will and that addicts simply 
need to and can pull themselves up by their bootstraps.  The empirical evidence for the 
moralizing third view seems weak, although such attitudes play a role in explaining the 
limited role the criminal law accords to addiction.  The Nobel-prize winning economist, 
Gary Becker, famously argued that addiction can be rational (1996). 
 This chapter demonstrates that, despite the debate and claims based on 
psychological, genetic and neuroscientific research to expand the mitigating and excusing 
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force of addiction in evaluating criminal responsibility, existing Anglo-American 
criminal law is most consistent with the choice position.  It also argues that this is a 
defensible approach that is consistent with current science and with traditional 
justifications of criminal blame and punishment. 
 The chapter first discusses preliminary issues to avoid potential objections that the 
discussion adopts an unrealistic view of addiction.  It then provides a general explanation 
of the responsibility criteria of the criminal law and addresses false or distracting claims 
about lack of responsibility.  Then it turns to analysis of the criminal law’s doctrines 
about addiction to confirm that the criminal law primarily adopts a choice model and that 
addiction per se plays almost no role in responsibility ascriptions.  It concludes with a 
general defense of present doctrine and practice, but suggests beneficial liberalizing 
reforms. 
 
Preliminary Assumptions About Addiction 
Virtually every factual or normative statement that can be made about addiction, 
is contestable. This section tries to be neutral. 
 The primary criteria of addiction commonly employed at present are behavioral, 
namely, persistent drug seeking and using, especially compulsively or with craving, in the 
face of negative consequences (Morse 2009).  The neural mechanisms of addiction are 
debatable, but are being intensively investigated (Hyman 2007), and environmental 
variables play an important role in explaining addictive behavior (Kalant 2010).  It is 
unsurprising that persistent use of brain altering substances changes both the brain and 
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behavior.  For example, there are effects on the brain’s reward circuits, memory, perception 
and motivation, all of which contribute to the maintenance of addictive behavior. 
The most important terms for criminal law purposes are “compulsive” and 
“negative consequences.”  The concept of compulsion or something like it is crucial to the 
no-choice model because without it addiction is just a very bad habit that is difficult to 
break.  Despite the current biologizing within the medical approach and scientific advances 
(e.g., Kasanetz et al. 2010), there is still no clear understanding of the biology of 
compulsively and persistently seeking and using substances.  Seeking and using are 
actions, not mechanisms.  There is no gold standard definition of or psychological or 
biological test for compulsivity, which must be demonstrated behaviorally.  There are 
extremely suggestive laboratory findings, especially with non-human animals (e.g., Everitt 
and Robbins 2005), but none is yet diagnostic for humans.  We still lack an adequate 
definition of compulsion that applies to actions rather than to mechanisms to explore 
compelled action’s biological basis.   
The usual behavioral criteria for compulsion are both subjective and objective.  
Addicts commonly report feelings of craving or that they have lost control or cannot help 
themselves.  If the agent persists in seeking and using despite ruinous medical, social, and 
legal consequences and despite an alleged desire to stop, we infer based on common sense 
that the person must be acting under compulsion.  It seems that there is no other way to 
explain the behavior, but it is not based on rigorous tests of a well-validated concept.   
Negative consequences, both internalities and externalities, are not necessarily part 
of the definition of addiction because, depending on the circumstances, it is possible to be 
a high functioning addict who does not suffer or impose substantial negative consequences.  
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Contingent social norms and expectations play a role in explaining how negative the 
consequences are, but addiction often has severely negative consequences (e.g., overdose, 
cancer, psychosis) independent of social norms and expectations.   
There are many findings about the biology and psychology of addicts that 
differentiate this group from non-addicts, but none of these findings is independently 
diagnostic.  Addiction must be demonstrated behaviorally.  Although the characterization 
of addiction as a “chronic and relapsing brain disease” is widely used, the characterization, 
“chronic and relapsing,” is not justified by the data (Heyman 2009, 2013).  Brain causation 
and brain differences do not per se make associated behaviors the signs or symptoms of a 
disease.  All behavior has brain causes and one would expect brain differences between 
any two groups exhibiting different behaviors.  Moreover, the relapse data were not 
gathered on random samples of addicts.  They have been largely gathered from addicts in 
treatment and this population is disproportionately co-morbid with other psychiatric 
disorders (Heyman 2009). Characterizing a return to maladaptive behavior as a “relapse” 
begs the question of whether the behavior is the sign or a symptom of a disease.  The latter 
must be established first in order properly to refer to the return as a “relapse” (Fingarette 
and Hasse 1979).  Whether addiction should be considered a disease like any other is still 
an open question.  Even if addicts have difficulty controlling their behavior, they are not 
zombies or automatons; they act intentionally to satisfy their desire to seek and to use drugs 
(Hyman 2007; Morse 2000, 2007a, 2009).   
 Most users of even the most allegedly addictive substances do not become addicts, 
but some substances increase the risk.  Whether one moves from casual recreational use or 
medical use to addiction is influenced by the agent’s set (psychological expectations) and 
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by the setting (the environment and its cues) (Zinberg 1984).  The substance itself does not 
account for all the variance in explaining addiction.  Some substances appear to be 
particularly addictive, but it is extremely difficult empirically to disentangle the causal 
variables.  It is nonetheless clear that the psychoactive properties of the drug alone do not 
turn people into helpless puppets. 
 A debated question is whether addiction should be limited to substances.  Large 
numbers of people engage persistently and apparently compulsively in various activities, 
often with negative consequences.  Gambling is an example.  If there are some activities 
or non-drug substances that can produce the same “addictive behavior” as drugs, then the 
criminal law response should perhaps be similar by analogy.  I believe that the concept of 
addiction should be expanded beyond drugs, but for this chapter will confine the analysis 
to drug-related addictions. 
 
The Concept of The Person and Responsibility in Criminal Law 
 This section offers a “goodness of fit” interpretation of current Anglo-American 
criminal law.  It does not suggest or imply that the law is optimal “as is,” but it provides a 
framework for thinking about the role addiction does and should play in a fair system of 
criminal justice. 
Criminal law presupposes the “folk psychological” view of the person and 
behavior.  This psychological theory, which has many variants, causally explains behavior 
in part by mental states such as desires, beliefs, intentions, willings, and plans (Ravenscroft 
2010).   Biological, sociological and other psychological variables also play a role, but folk 
psychology considers mental states fundamental to a full explanation of human action.  
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Lawyers, philosophers and scientists argue about the definitions of mental states and 
theories of action, but that does not undermine the general claim that mental states are 
fundamental.  The arguments and evidence disputants use to convince others itself 
presupposes the folk psychological view of the person.  Brains don’t convince each other; 
people do. 
For example, the folk psychological explanation for why you are reading this 
chapter is, roughly, that you desire to understand the relation of addiction to agency and 
responsibility in criminal law, you believe that reading the chapter will help fulfill that 
desire, and thus you formed the intention to read it.  This is a “practical” explanation rather 
than a deductive syllogism.   
 Folk psychology does not presuppose the truth of free will, it is consistent with the 
truth of determinism, it does not hold that we have minds that are independent of our bodies 
(although it, and ordinary speech, sound that way), and it presupposes no particular moral 
or political view.  It does not claim that all mental states are conscious or that people go 
through a conscious decision-making process each time that they act.  It allows for 
“thoughtless,” automatic, and habitual actions and for non-conscious intentions.  It does 
presuppose that human action will at least be rationalizable by mental state explanations or 
that it will be responsive to reasons under the right conditions.  The definition of folk 
psychology being used does not depend on any particular bit of folk wisdom about how 
people are motivated, feel, or act.  Any of these bits, such as that people intend the natural 
and probable consequences of their actions, may be wrong. The definition insists only that 
human action is in part causally explained by mental states. 
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Responsibility concepts involve acting agents and not social structures, 
underlying psychological variables, brains, or nervous systems.  The latter types of 
variables may shed light on whether the folk psychological responsibility criteria are met, 
but they must always be translated into the law’s folk psychological criteria.  For 
example, demonstrating that an addict has a genetic vulnerability or a neurotransmitter 
defect tells the law nothing per se about whether an addict is responsible.  Such scientific 
evidence must be probative of the law’s criteria and demonstrating this requires an 
argument about how it is probative. 
The criminal law’s criteria for responsibility, like the criteria for addiction, are acts 
and mental states.  Thus, the criminal law is a folk-psychological institution (Sifferd 2006).  
First, the agent must perform a prohibited intentional act (or omission) in a state of 
reasonably integrated consciousness (the so-called “act” requirement, sometimes 
misleadingly termed the “voluntary act”). Second, virtually all serious crimes require that 
the person had a further mental state, the mens rea, regarding the prohibited harm.  Lawyers 
term these definitional criteria for prima facie culpability the “elements” of the crime.  They 
are the criteria that the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.  For example, 
one definition of murder is the intentional killing of another human being.  To be prima 
facie guilty of murder, the person must have intentionally performed some act that kills, 
such as shooting or knifing, and it must have been his intent to kill when he shot or knifed. 
If the agent does not act at all because his bodily movement is not intentional—for example, 
a reflex or spasmodic movement—then there is no violation of the prohibition. There is 
also no violation in cases in which the further mental state required by the definition is 
lacking. For example, if the defendant’s intentional killing action kills only because the 
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defendant was careless, then the defendant may be guilty of some homicide crime, but not 
of intentional homicide.   
Criminal responsibility is not necessarily complete if the defendant’s behavior 
satisfies the definition of the crime. The criminal law provides for so-called affirmative 
defenses that negate responsibility even if the prima facie case has been proven.  
Affirmative defenses are either justifications or excuses.  The former obtain if behavior 
otherwise unlawful is right or at least permissible under the specific circumstances. For 
example, intentionally killing someone who is wrongfully trying to kill you, acting in 
self-defense, is certainly legally permissible and many think it is right.  Excuses exist 
when the defendant has done wrong but is not responsible for his behavior.  Using 
generic descriptive language, the excusing conditions are lack of reasonable capacity for 
rationality and lack of reasonable capacity for self-control (although the latter is more 
controversial than the former).  The so-called cognitive and control tests for legal insanity 
are examples of these excusing conditions. Note that these excusing conditions are 
expressed as capacities.  If an agent possessed a legally relevant capacity but simply did 
not exercise it at the time of committing the crime or was responsible for undermining his 
capacity, no defense will be allowed.  Finally, the defendant will be excused if he was 
acting under duress, coercion or compulsion. The degree of incapacity or coercion 
required for an excuse is a normative question that can have different legal responses 
depending on a culture’s moral conceptions and material circumstances.  Addiction is 
always considered the potential basis for an  excusing or mitigating condition.  
It may appear that the capacity for self-control and the absence of coercion are the 
same, but for purposes of addressing the relation between addiction and responsibility, it 
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is helpful to distinguish them.  The capacity for self-control or “will power,” is conceived 
of as a relatively stable, enduring trait or congeries of abilities possessed by the 
individual that can be influenced by external events (Holton 2009).  This capacity is at 
issue in “one-party” cases, in which the agent claims that he could not help himself in the 
absence of external threat.  In some cases, the capacity for control is poor 
characterologically; in other cases it may be undermined by variables that are not the 
defendant’s fault, such as mental disorder.  The meaning of this capacity is fraught.  
Many investigators around the world are studying “self-control,” but there is no 
conceptual or empirical consensus.  Indeed, such conceptual and operational problems 
motivated both the American Psychiatric Association Insanity Defense Work Group 
(1983) and the American Bar Association (1989) to reject control tests for legal insanity 
during the 1980s wave of insanity defense reform in the United States.  In all cases in 
which such issues are raised, the defendant does act to satisfy the allegedly overpowering 
desire.  In contrast, compulsion exists if the defendant was compelled to act by being 
placed in a “do-it-or-else,” hard-choice situation.  For example, suppose that a miscreant 
gunslinger threatens to kill me unless I kill another entirely innocent agent.  I have no 
right to kill the third person, but if I do it to save my own life, I may be granted the 
excuse of duress. Note that in cases of external compulsion, unlike cases of no action, the 
agent does act intentionally.  Also, note that there is no characterological self-control 
problem in these cases.  The excuse is premised on external threats, not on/ internal 
drives and deficient control mechanisms. 
This account of criminal responsibility is most tightly linked to traditional 
retributive justifications of punishment, which hold that punishment is not justified unless 
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the offender morally deserves it because the offender was responsible.  With exceptions 
that need not detain us and prove the point, desert is at least a necessary precondition for 
blame and punishment in Anglo-American law. The account is also consistent with 
traditional consequential justifications for punishment, such as general deterrence. No 
offender should be punished unless he at least deserves such punishment. Even if good 
consequences might be achieved by punishing non-responsible addicts or by punishing 
responsible addicts more than they deserve, such punishment would require very weighty 
justification in a system that takes desert seriously. 
False Starts and Dangerous Distractions 
This section considers four false and distracting claims that are sometimes made 
about the responsibility of addicts (and others): 1) the truth of determinism undermines 
genuine responsibility; 2) causation, and especially abnormal causation, of behavior 
entails that the behavior must be excused; 3) causation is the equivalent of compulsion, 
and 4) addicts are automatons. 
The alleged incompatibility of determinism and responsibility is foundational. 
Determinism is not a continuum concept that applies to various individuals in various 
degrees. There is no partial or selective determinism. If the universe is deterministic or 
something quite like it, responsibility is possible or it is not. If human beings are fully 
subject to the causal laws of the universe, as a thoroughly physicalist, naturalist 
worldview holds, then many philosophers claim that “ultimate” responsibility is 
impossible (e.g., Pereboom 2001; Strawson 1989). On the other hand, plausible 
“compatibilist” theories suggest that responsibility is possible in a deterministic universe 
(Vihvelin 2013;Wallace 1994). 
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There seems no resolution to this debate in sight, but our moral and legal practices 
do not treat everyone or no one as responsible. Determinism cannot be guiding our 
practices. If one wants to excuse addicts because they are genetically and neurally 
determined or determined for any other reason to be addicts or to commit crimes related 
to their addictions, one is committed to negating the possibility of responsibility for 
everyone. 
Our criminal responsibility criteria and practices have nothing to do with 
determinism or with the necessity of having so-called “free will” (Morse, 2007b).  Free 
will, the metaphysical libertarian capacity to cause one’s own behavior uncaused by 
anything other than oneself, is neither a criterion for any criminal law doctrine nor 
foundational for criminal responsibility.  Criminal responsibility involves evaluation of 
intentional, conscious, and potentially rational human action. And few participants in the 
debate about determinism and free will or responsibility argue that we are not conscious, 
intentional, potentially rational creatures when we act.  The truth of determinism does not 
entail that actions and non-actions are indistinguishable and that there is no distinction 
between rational and non-rational actions or compelled and uncompelled actions. Our 
current responsibility concepts and practices use criteria consistent with and independent 
of the truth of determinism. 
A related confusion is that, once a non-intentional causal explanation has been 
identified for action, the person must be excused. In other words, the claim is that 
causation per se is an excusing condition. This is sometimes called the “causal theory of 
excuse.” Thus, if one identifies genetic, neurophysiological, or other causes for behavior, 
then allegedly the person is not responsible. In a thoroughly physical world, however, this 
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claim is either identical to the determinist critique of responsibility and furnishes a 
foundational challenge all responsibility, or it is simply an error. I term this the 
“fundamental psycholegal error” because it is erroneous and incoherent as a description 
of our actual doctrines and practices (Morse 1994). Non-causation of behavior is not and 
could not be a criterion for responsibility because all behaviors, like all other phenomena, 
are caused. Causation, even by abnormal physical variables, is not per se an excusing 
condition. Abnormal physical variables, such as neurotransmitter deficiencies, may cause 
a genuine excusing condition, such as the lack of rational capacity, but then the lack of 
rational capacity, not causation, is doing the excusing work. If causation were an excuse, 
no one would be responsible for any action. Unless proponents of the causal theory of 
excuse can furnish a convincing reason why causation per se excuses, we have no reason 
to jettison the criminal law’s responsibility doctrines and practices. 
Third, causation is not the equivalent of lack of self-control capacity or 
compulsion.  All behavior is caused, but only some defendants lack control capacity or 
act under compulsion.  If causation were the equivalent of lack of self-control or 
compulsion, no one would be responsible for any criminal behavior.  This is clearly not 
the criminal law’s view. 
A last confusion is that addicts are automatons whose behavioral signs are not 
human actions.  We have addressed this issue before, but it is worth re-emphasizing that 
even if compulsive seeking and using substances are the signs of a disease, they are 
nonetheless human actions and thus distinguishable from purely mechanical signs and 
symptoms, such as spasms.  Moreover, actions can always be evaluated morally (Morse 
2007a). 
13 
 
Now, with a description of addiction and responsibility criteria in place and with 
an understanding of false starts, let us turn to the relation of addiction to criminal 
responsibility, beginning with the law’s doctrines. 
 
Criminal Law Doctrine and Addiction: Background 
 The introduction to this chapter suggested that the law’s approach to addiction is 
most consistent with the choice model.  The ancient criminal law treated the “habitual” or 
“common” drunkard as guilty of a status offense and drunkenness was considered wrong 
in itself.  The choice model is older than Blackstone, the great 18th C. judge best known 
for his Commentaries, which tried to systematize English law.  Although the legal 
landscape has altered, the choice model is still dominant. 
To provide background, the section discussed  three illustrative, iconic cases 
concerning addiction: Robinson v. California (1962), Powell v. Texas (1968) and United 
States v. Moore (1973).  Although these cases are older, their holdings and reasoning 
continue to be robustly emblematic of the criminal law’s response to addiction and to a 
compulsion defense based on addiction.  The next section canvasses current doctrine. 
 Walter Lawrence Robinson was a needle-injecting drug addict who was convicted 
of a California statute that made it a crime to "be addicted to the use of narcotics" and he 
was sentenced to ninety days in jail. The only evidence that he was an addict was needle 
marks.  Robinson appealed to the Supreme Court on the ground that punishing him for 
being an addict was a violation of the 8th and 14th Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment.  There were many different opinions written in the case, but a 
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majority agreed that punishing for addiction was unconstitutional.  (As a sad footnote, 
Robinson died of an overdose before the case was decided.) 
 It is difficult to determine precisely what reasoning was the foundation for the 
Court’s constitutional conclusion, but for our purposes three stand out: it is 
unconstitutional to punish for status alone or because addiction is a disease or because 
addiction is “involuntary.”  Herbert Fingarette and Anne Fingarette Hasse demonstrated 
conclusively decades ago that the disease rationale collapses into either the status 
rationale or the involuntariness rationale (1979), so let us examine what implications 
follow from each of the two. The status rationale is far more modest and simply builds on 
the general criminal law requirement that criminal liability generally requires action (or 
intentional omission in appropriate cases).  Robinson was not charged with possession or 
use, but simply with the status of being an addict.  In dissent, Justice White pointed out 
that if it was unfair to punish an addict for his status, why would it not be equally unfair 
to punish him for the actions that are signs of that status.  It is a clever question, but 
ignores the view of addiction as a chronic and relapsing disorder.  On this view, one can 
be an addict even if one is not using at the moment.  Again, the status argument is modest 
because it betokens no genuine widening of non-responsibility conditions.  Indeed, it is a 
narrowing holding because the older common law permitted punishment for prohibited 
statuses. 
The “involuntariness” claim more extensively suggests that punishing people for 
conditions and their associated behaviors that they are helpless to prevent is also 
unconstitutional.  Adopting the involuntariness position would be an invitation to 
undermining the choice model in light of some strains of thought about addiction. 
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Those who wanted to test the meaning of Robinson did not have long to wait. The 
defendant-appellant in Powell, Mr. Leroy Powell, was a chronic alcoholic who spent all 
his money on wine and who had been frequently arrested and convicted for public 
drunkenness.  In the present case, his defense counsel argued that because Mr. Powell 
was afflicted with "the disease of chronic alcoholism,...his appearance in public [while 
drunk] was not of his own volition," (p. 517)  and thus to punish Mr. Powell for this 
symptomatic behavior would be a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment.  Powell appealed his conviction to the Supreme Court.  
The Court was asked to hold that it was unconstitutional to punish a person if a condition 
essential to the definition of the crime charged  is “part of the pattern of his disease and is 
occasioned by a compulsion symptomatic of the disease.”  Note that this is an extremely 
sympathetic case for a compulsion excuse.  The crime was not serious and the criminal 
behavior, public intoxication, was a typical manifestation of his alcoholism. 
The Supreme Court rejected Mr. Powell’s claim for many reasons, including that 
it went too far  on the basis of too little knowledge and that it was unclear that providing 
a defense in such cases would improve the condition of people suffering from alcoholism.  
But Justice Marshall’s plurality opinion was also skeptical of the underlying compulsion 
claim and in the course of the opinion quoted the expert testimony extensively and part of 
Mr. Powell’s testimony in full. Mr. Powell's proposed defense was supported by the 
testimony of an expert psychiatrist, Dr. David Wade, who testified that, 
a "chronic alcoholic" is an "involuntary drinker," who is "powerless not to drink," 
and who "loses his self-control over his drinking" (p. 518). 
Based on his examination of Mr. Powell, Dr. Wade concluded that Powell was, 
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a "chronic alcoholic," who "by the time he has reached [the state of 
intoxication]...is not able to control his behavior, and...has reached this point 
because he has an uncontrollable compulsion to drink (p. 518). 
Dr. Wade also opined that Powell lacked "the willpower to resist the constant excessive 
consumption of alcohol."  The doctor admitted that Powell's first drink when sober was a 
"voluntary exercise of will," but qualified this answer by claiming that alcoholics have a 
compulsion that is a "very strong influence, an exceedingly strong influence," that clouds 
their judgment.  Finally, Dr. Wade suggested that jailing Powell without treatment would 
fail to discourage Powell's consumption of alcohol and related problems.  One could not 
find a more clear expression of the medicalized, disease concept of addiction to ethanol. 
 Powell himself testified about his undisputed chronic alcoholism.  He also 
testified that he could not stop drinking.  Powell's cross-examination concerning the 
events of the day of his trial is worth quoting in full. 
Q: You took that one [drink] at eight o'clock [a.m.] because you wanted to drink? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: And you knew that if you drank it, you could keep on drinking and get drunk? 
A: Well, I was supposed to be here on trial, and I didn't take but that one drink. 
Q: You knew you had to be here this afternoon, but this morning you took one 
drink and then you knew that you couldn't afford to drink anymore and come to 
court; is that right? 
A: Yes, sir, that's right. 
Q: Because you knew what you would do if you kept drinking, that you would 
finally pass out or be picked up? 
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A: Yes, sir. 
Q: And you didn't want that to happen to you today? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: Not today? 
A: No, sir. 
Q: So you only had one drink today? 
A: Yes, sir (pp. 519-520). 
On redirect examination, Powell's attorney elicited further explanation. 
Q: Leroy, isn't the real reason why you just had one drink today because you just 
had enough money to buy one drink? 
A: Well, that was just give to me. 
Q: In other words, you didn't have any money with which you could buy drinks 
yourself? 
A: No, sir, that was give to me. 
Q: And that's really what controlled the amount you drank this morning, isn't it? 
A: Yes, sir. 
Q: Leroy, when you start drinking, do you have any control over how many 
drinks you can take? 
 A: No, sir (p. 520). 
 
Powell wanted to drink and had that first drink, but despite that last answer his 
compulsion did not cause him to engage in the myriad lawful and unlawful means he 
might easily have used to obtain more alcohol if his craving was desperately compulsive.  
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Although Powell was a core case of an addict, he could refrain from using if he had a 
good enough reason to do so.   
Although this was a sympathetic case, the Justice Marshall for a plurality was 
simply unwilling to abandon the choice model that guides legal policy and to impose a 
“one size fits all” constitutionally-required compulsion defense. The case interpreted 
Robinson as barring punishment for status and not as imposing a constitutional 
involuntariness defense.  Finally, note that if the Court had accepted Powell’s argument, 
it would not have created a specific “addiction” defense.  Rather, it would have adopted a 
general compulsion defense in any case in which criminal behavior was a symptom 
allegedly compelled by a defendant’s disease, whether the disease was addiction or any 
other. 
Now let us turn to Moore.  Raymond Moore was almost certainly a trafficking 
heroin addict in Washington D.C. who was charged with possession of heroin.  Moore’s 
expert witness, Dr. Kaufman, testified out of the hearing of the jury that Moore was a 
long-term addict, that Moore’s addiction was a disease, and that as a result, Moore was 
“helpless to control his compulsion to obtain and use heroin” (p. 1143).  Moore requested 
the judge to charge the jury that this condition could be a basis for a defense to the 
possession charges.  Like Leroy Powell, Raymond Moore presents an apparently 
sympathetic case.  Mere possession of heroin is more serious than public intoxication, but 
it is not a very serious crime—at least not in my opinion.  Possession is necessary part of 
the diagnostic criteria of the disorder because one cannot use a substance unless one 
possesses it and there was uncontested evidence that Moore could not control his 
compulsion to obtain (possess) and use the substance. Nevertheless, despite this 
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testimony and in the absence of countervailing evidence, the trial judge refused to instruct 
that jury that addiction might be the basis for a compulsion defense, even for a non-
trafficking addict.   
Moore was convicted and appealed to the influential United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, claiming that his conviction was improper 
because he was a heroin addict with an overpowering need to use heroin and should not, 
therefore, have been held criminally responsible for being in possession of the drug.  
According to Moore, the case had one central issue:  
“Is the proffered evidence of…long and intensive dependence on (addiction to) 
injected heroin, resulting in substantial impairment of his behavior controls and a 
loss of self-control over the use of heroin, relevant to his criminal responsibility 
for unlawful possession” (p. 1144). 
Many judges wrote separately, but a majority did vote to affirm the conviction, thus 
rejecting Moore’s proposed defense.  The judges who voted to confirm Moore’s 
conviction noted variously that: 1) there was controversy over whether addiction is a 
disease and whether we are able to  know an addict’s genuine capacity to refrain from 
using; 2) the defense would apply to any defendant with impaired behavioral controls, 
even in the absence of an allegedly objective cause such as a disease; 3) it would apply 
not only to possession, but also to any other crimes committed to support the addiction; 
and, 4) adopting such a defense would undermine the strong public policy supporting the 
prohibition of sale and possession of controlled substances.  For these reasons, they 
rejected adopting Moore’s proposed defense. 
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 There were two very strong dissents. In one, the judge wrote that the common law 
should embrace a new principle according to which a drug addict who lacks substantial 
capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law as a result of drug use 
should not be held criminally responsible for mere possession for his own use.  The 
opinion rejected as speculative the claim that deterrence would be undermined.  The 
judge recognized that the compulsion claim might be difficult to limit to mere possession, 
but evaded the problem by arguing that Congress intended that the defense should not go 
this far.  In a second, partial dissent, the chief judge of the circuit, David Bazelon, argued 
that the principle behind adopting the defense applied to crimes other than mere 
possession and that juries should also hear evidence about compulsion arising from 
addiction when other crimes were charged, including armed robbery or trafficking. 
 Taken together, these cases appear to adopt the choice perspective for two 
reasons: addicts have sufficient choice, and the public policy supporting criminalization 
would be undermined by providing a defense, even if it could be shown that addicts have 
little choice about mere possession and perhaps other crimes related to their addiction.  
With these background cases in mind, let us now turn more generally to current doctrine 
to explore the criminal law’s choice model.   
Current Doctrine and the Choice Model 
Recall that crimes are defined by their elements and that affirmative defenses are 
available even if the prosecution is able to prove all the elements of the crime.  This 
section will first discuss the affirmative defenses, then it will address the use of 
intoxication to defend against the elements of the crime charged, which is termed 
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“negating” an element, and will finally discuss the role of addiction in sentencing and 
diversion. 
Given that there is still controversy about how much choice addicts have, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that the conclusions in Powell and Moore are still regnant.  The 
criminal law has avoided expanding a defense based on addiction raised by the Moore 
dissenters.  Addiction is not an affirmative defense per se to any crime in the United 
States, England or Canada. With one limited and somewhat unsettled  exception in 
English homicide law (Ashworth and Horder 2013, pp. 271-72; R. v Bunch, 2013), it is 
also not the basis for any other affirmative defense, such as legal insanity.  Indeed, some 
United States jurisdictions explicitly exclude addiction (or related terms)) as the basis for 
an insanity defense despite the inclusion of this class of disorder in the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth 
Edition [DSM-5] (2013). The claim that an intoxicated addict might not have committed 
the crime if he had not been intoxicated has no legal purchase, although some, such as the 
great English criminal law scholar, Glanville Williams (1961, p. 564), disagree.  Indeed, 
addiction does not even merit an index entry in most Anglo-American criminal law texts, 
except in the context of the use of alcohol intoxication as a defense in some instances that 
will be explored below.    
The only exception to the bar to using addiction as an affirmative defense or the 
basis of one is what is known in the United States as “settled insanity.”  If a defendant 
has become permanently mentally disordered beyond addiction, say, suffers from 
delirium tremens, as a result of the prolonged use of intoxicants, the defense of legal 
insanity may be raised. 
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An enormous number of crimes are committed by people who are under the 
influence of intoxicating substances.  In what follows I shall discuss the use of 
intoxication to negate the elements of the crime charged, but readers should know that 
these doctrines apply generally to addicts and non-addicts alike.  Of course, addicts are 
more likely to be high than non-addicts and thus these rules will disproportionately affect 
them, but the application to addicts will be the same as to non-addicts.  Whether the 
criminal law should distinguish addicts from non-addicts for these purposes will be 
discussed in the next section of the chapter. 
Recall that most crimes require a mens rea, a culpable mental state that 
accompanies the prohibited conduct.  How evidence of intoxication might be used to 
negate the elements of the crime charged is the question of logical relevance: Does the 
evidence of intoxication in fact tend to show that an element was not present?  First, the 
defendant might be so drunk that his consciousness is sufficiently dissociated to negate 
the act requirement.  Second, the defendant’s intoxication may be relevant to whether he 
formed the mental state, the mens rea, required by the definition of the crime.  For 
example, imagine a very drunk defendant in the woods with a gun.  In the drunken belief 
that he is shooting at a tree because his perceptions are so altered, he ends up killing a 
human being wearing camouflage gear.  If he really believed that he was shooting at a 
tree, he simply did not form the intent to kill required for intentional homicide.  To take 
another example, imagine that a very drunk patron at a bar walks out without paying the 
bill.  Suppose the bar owner claims that he has been defrauded by the drunk patron, a 
form of theft.  The patron claims that he was so drunk that he forgot to pay the bill but 
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formed no intent to steal.  If this form of criminal behavior requires the intent to steal and 
we believe the patron, he simply did not form that intent. 
The logical relevance point is straightforward.  If the defendant did not act or 
lacked the mens rea for the crime charged, how can he be guilty of that crime (although 
he may be guilty of some other offense for which he does have the mens rea)?  Despite 
this logic, a substantial minority of United States jurisdictions refuse to admit into 
evidence undeniably factually relevant and probative voluntary intoxication evidence 
proffered  to negate mens rea.  The remaining United States jurisdictions and English law 
admit it only with substantial restrictions.   
The reasons for complete exclusion and for restriction of the admissibility of 
relevant evidence of voluntary intoxication result, I believe, primarily from the choice 
model and from fears for public safety.  In the case of restricted testimony, the rules are 
highly technical, but typically evidence of intoxication is admitted to negate the mens 
reas for some crimes but not for others, even if mens rea in the latter case might actually 
be negated. The defendant will therefore be convicted of those crimes for which 
intoxication evidence is not admissible even if the defendant lacked mens rea.  The rules 
are a compromise between culpability and public safety and the apparent unfairness of 
convicting a defendant of a crime for which he lacked mens rea is in part justified by his 
own fault in becoming intoxicated, a classic choice model rationale. 
Leading precedents in the United States and England adopt choice reasoning 
explicitly.  In Montana v. Egelhoff (1996) the United States Supreme Court held that 
complete exclusion of voluntary intoxication evidence proffered to negate mens rea was 
not unconstitutional.  Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion provided a number of reasons why 
24 
 
a jurisdiction might wish on policy grounds to exclude otherwise relevant, probative 
evidence.  Among these were public safety and juror confusion.  But one is a perfect 
example of the choice model. 
And finally, the rule comports with and implements society’s moral perception 
that one who has voluntarily impaired his own faculties should be responsible for 
the consequences (p. 50). 
This view is standard in both common law and continental criminal law (in which it is 
called actio libera in causa): a defendant should not benefit from a defense that he has 
culpably created.  The choice model is strongly at work. 
 In D.P.P. v. Majewski (1977), a unanimous House of Lords upheld one of the 
technical distinctions alluded to above that permit defendants to introduce intoxication 
evidence to negate the mens reas of only some crimes.  Most of the Lords recognized that 
there was some illogic in the rule, but all upheld it as either a justifiable compromise or as 
sound in itself and it had long provenance.  Most striking for our purpose, however, is 
one passage from Lord Elwyn-Jones’ opinion for the Court.  He wrote, 
If a man of his own volition takes a substance which causes him to cast off the 
restraints of reason and conscience, no wrong is done to him by holding him 
answerable criminally for any injury he may do while in that condition. His 
course of conduct in reducing himself by drugs and drink to that condition in my 
view supplies the evidence of mens rea, of guilty mind certainly sufficient for 
crimes of basic intent. It is a reckless course of conduct and recklessness is 
enough to constitute the necessary mens rea in assault cases… The drunkenness is 
itself an intrinsic, an integral part of the crime, the other part being the evidence 
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of the unlawful use of force against the victim. Together they add up to criminal 
recklessness (pp. 474-5). 
In other words, the culpability in getting drunk—itself not a crime—is the equivalent of 
actually foreseeing the consequences of one’s actions even if the intoxicated defendant 
did not foresee them.  Such reasoning—Majewski chose to get drunk, after all—presaged 
Justice Scalia’s argument in Egelhoff and is clearly based on the choice model.  
 Despite massive academic criticism of the Majewski rule and numerous Law 
Commission reform proposals, it remains the rule and many think it works reasonably 
well.  Some Commonwealth countries, such as Australia, New Zealand and Canada, have 
the more expansive logical relevance rule and it seems not to have opened the floodgates 
of alcohol-awash crime (Ashworth and Horder 2013).  Apparently, however, juries in 
those jurisdictions seldom fully acquit, suggesting that the culpability based on choice 
model is implicitly guiding decision making even if the law is more lenient.
 Finally, even the Model Penal Code in the United States, which has had major 
influence on law reform and which strongly emphasizes subjective culpability and rejects 
strict liability of the sort Majewski potentially imposes, adopted a similar rule in Section 
2.08(2) of the Code (American Law Institute 1962).  If an intoxicated defendant was not 
aware of a risk he would have been aware of if was sober, then he will be held to have 
been aware of the risk.   When substances are involved, the choice model seems 
recalcitrant to change. 
In short, Anglo-American rules concerning the effects of voluntary intoxication 
on prima facie culpability strongly reflect the choice model with no or some 
qualifications. 
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The need for completeness compels me at this point to mention involuntary 
intoxication, that is, intoxication occasioned through no fault of the agent.  Examples 
would be mistakenly consuming an intoxicant, or being duped into or forced to consume 
one.  The law treats such cases more permissively than cases of voluntary intoxication by 
providing a limited complete defense and the ability to negate all mens rea.  But it does 
not apply to intoxication associated with addiction because the law currently treats such 
states of intoxication as the agent’s fault even though many addiction specialists would 
vehemently disagree.  The law’s view of involuntariness in this context could apply to 
addicts and non-addicts alike.  Even addicts could be duped or coerced into becoming 
intoxicated on a given occasion. 
 
Addiction-Related Legal Practices 
There are two United States contexts in which addiction has potential mitigating 
force: sentencing, particularly capital sentencing, and diversion to specialized drug 
courts.  There are no studies that empirically examine the degree to which evidence of 
addiction is sought to be used as a mitigating factor during non-capital sentencing and it 
is never listed as a statutorily specified mitigating factor.  It is probably the case that the 
same considerations about its impact would apply in both non-capital and capital 
sentencing, so I shall discuss only the latter.  
Beginning in 1978, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held  that 
capital defendants can produce virtually any mitigating evidence (Lockett v. Ohio 1978) 
and the bar for the admissibility for such evidence is low.  Thus, even if addiction is not a 
statutory mitigating factor, an addicted defendant convicted of capital murder may 
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certainly introduce evidence of his condition for the purpose of showing that addiction 
diminished his capacity for rationality or self-control or to support any other relevant 
mitigating theory.  Doing so also raises the danger that addiction will be thought to 
aggravate culpability based on the choice perspective—especially the moralistic strain—
and it is possible that it will make the defendant seem more dangerous, which is a 
statutory aggravating factor in some jurisdictions.  Addiction is a knife that could cut 
both ways in capital and non-capital sentencing. 
 Drug courts are an increasingly common phenomenon in the United States.  The 
substantive and procedural details vary across jurisdictions, but these courts aim to divert 
from criminal prosecution to the drug courts addicted criminal defendants charged with 
non-violent crimes whose addiction played a role in their criminal conduct.  If diverted 
defendants successfully complete the drug court imposed regimen of staying clean and in 
treatment, they are discharged and the criminal charges are dropped.  This approach 
seems eminently sensible and these courts have fervent supporters, but they also have 
critics on the grounds that they do not afford proper due process and genuinely solid 
evidence for their cost-benefit justified efficacy is lacking.  Whatever the merits of the 
debate may be, drug courts are now an entrenched feature of criminal justice in a majority 
of United States jurisdictions and they do permit some number of addicts to avoid 
criminal conviction and punishment. 
A Defense of Current Criminal Law 
 Criminal law is generally unforgiving towards addicts specifically and those 
doctrines that might sometimes favor addicts, such as the rules about negating mens rea, 
are not specific to addicts but apply more generally.  Given the profound effects of 
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addiction, can such unyielding rules be fair?  Although many addicts are responsible for 
becoming addicted, the following discussion will assume that an addict is not responsible 
for becoming an addict, say, because he became addicted as a youth or because he was in 
pathological denial about what was happening.  I shall also assume that the rules apply to 
adults and that juveniles require special treatment. 
 Let us begin with affirmative defense.  Consider an addict who is broadly 
mentally debilitated by chronic intoxication.  Recall that the law is already forgiving in 
such cases, permitting the addict suffering from “settled insanity” to raise the full 
excusing condition of legal insanity.  Most addicts are not so severely debilitated, 
however, so let us turn to the more “typical” addict. 
 I believe that there are roughly two accounts for why addicts might not be 
responsible for addiction-related crimes, including possession and other crimes 
committed to obtain drugs (Morse 2011)..  The first is irrationality. As a result of various 
psychological factors, including cue salience, craving, memory, and other variables, at 
times of peak desire the addict simply cannot “think straight,” cannot bring to bear the 
good reasons to refrain.  This assumes that addicts do have good reasons to refrain, but 
this may not always be true (Burroughs 2013, esp. pp. 144-47).  The irrationality theory 
is consistent with the view that regards self-control difficulties as resulting from an 
agent’s inability to consider distant rather than immediate consequences.  The other 
account uses a different form of self-control that analogizes the addict’s subjective state 
at times of peak craving as akin to the legal excuse of duress.  The addict is threatened by 
such dysphoria if he doesn’t use substances that he experiences the situation like a “do it 
or else” threat of a gun to one’s head.  Whether one finds these accounts or another 
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convincing, there is surely some plausible theory of excuse or mitigation that would 
apply to many addicts at the time of criminal behavior.  A very attractive case for a more 
forgiving legal response arises if one believes that once an agent is addicted, he will 
inevitably be in an excusing state at the time of his crimes on some and perhaps most 
occasions,  
 There are at least three difficulties with this position, one of which seems 
relatively decisive.  First, much is still not understood about the actual choice possibilities 
of “typical” addicts.  Maybe most can in fact think straight at the times of their crimes but 
choose not to or they are not substantially threatened by dysphoria or, even if they are 
threatened with severe dysphoria, they retain the capacity not to give in.  The criminal 
law is justified in adopting the more “conservative” approach under such conditions of 
uncertainty.  Second and relatedly, unforgiving criminal law doctrines enhance 
deterrence.  The demand for and use of drugs is price elastic for addicts.  Addicts retain 
capacity for choice.  The threat of criminal sanctions might well deter addiction-related 
criminal behavior on the margin. 
 The third and seemingly most decisive reason is the potential for diachronous 
responsibility (Kennett 2001) for addicts who do not suffer from settled insanity..  Even if 
they are not responsible at the times of peak craving as previously discussed, at earlier 
quiescent times they are lucid.  They know then from experience that they will again be 
in a psychological state in which they will find it subjectively very difficult not to use 
drugs or to engage in other criminal conduct to obtain drugs.  In those moments, they are 
responsible and know it is their other- and self-regarding duty not to permit themselves to 
be in a situation in which they will find it supremely difficult to refrain from criminal 
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behavior.  They then must take whatever steps are necessary to prevent themselves from 
allowing that state to occur, especially if there is a serious risk of violent addiction-
related crimes such as armed robbery or burglary.   If they do not, they will be 
responsible for any crimes they commit, although they might otherwise qualify for 
mitigation or an excuse.   
An analogy from criminal law may be instructive.  In a famous case, a person 
suffering from epilepsy and subject to seizures had a seizure and blacked out while 
driving on the public highway (People v. Decina, 1956).  His automobile ran up on the 
curb and killed four pedestrians.  Because he was blacked out, the killing conduct was not 
his act and he had no mens rea at the time of the killing.  Nevertheless, he was held liable 
for negligent homicide as a result of his careless previous act of driving while knowing 
he was subject to seizures.  Unless addicts are always non-responsible, an assertion 
contradicted by the clinical facts, diachronous responsibility is a sufficient ground to 
deny an excuse to addicts. 
 For similar reasons, the criminal law is justified in not providing addicts with 
enhanced ability to negate mens rea.  Recall that the law limits the use of intoxication 
evidence to negate mens rea in part because it views most cases of intoxication as the 
user’s fault.  Many would claim, however, that the intoxication of addicts is a sign of 
their disorder and not their fault.  Thus, a crucial part of the rational for limitations on 
mens rea negation should not apply to addicts.  Nevertheless, for the reasons addressed 
just above, when addicts are not intoxicated and not in peak craving states, they know 
they will become intoxicated again unless they take steps to avoid future intoxication, 
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which they are capable of doing when lucid.   Consequently, the law need not be more 
relaxed about mens rea negation for addicts than non-addicts. 
 Two counter-arguments to the above reasons to retain current law are denial and 
lack of opportunity.  As people slide into addiction—and almost no one becomes an 
addict after first use—they may well deny to themselves and others that they are on such 
a perilous path.  This suggests that they may not be fully responsible or responsible at all 
for becoming addicts.  Genuine addicts, or at least most of them, know they are addicted 
or at least understand that there is a “problem.” Assertions to the contrary are again 
inconsistent with the clinical facts.  Even if denial, anyway a vexed concept in psychiatry, 
prevents addicts from understanding that they are addicted, if they get into trouble with 
the law as a result of drug use, they know that they at least have a “problem” resulting 
from use.  At that point, they also  know in their lucid moments that they have the duty to 
take the steps necessary to avoid criminal behavior.  Diachronous responsibility still 
obtains. 
 By lack of opportunity, I mean the limited treatment resources available in many 
places to addicts who wish to exercise their diachronous responsibility and to refrain 
from further criminal behavior.  We know from spontaneous remission rates that most 
addicts can apparently quit using permanently without treatment, but typically they do so 
after numerous failed attempts and only after they have recognized the good reasons to do 
so, usually involving family obligations, self-esteem or the like (Heyman 2009, 2013).  
Fear of criminal sanctions appears to be an insufficient reason for many.  Thus, especially 
when the typical addict is young, having trouble quitting and at higher risk for crimes 
other than possession, it may be too much to ask of such addicts to refrain without 
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outside help.  If outside help is unavailable, diachronous responsibility would be unfair.  I 
think that there is much to this counter-argument, although it certainly weakens as the 
addiction-related crimes become more serious, such as armed robbery or even homicide. 
Criticism of Current Legal Regulation of Addiction 
 Having offered a principled defense of current legal doctrines concerning 
addiction, I should now like to suggest that on both rights and consequential grounds, the 
criminal law concerning controlled substances and addictions is misguided.  Space 
limitations prevent me from offering anything but the most superficial, sketchy gesture 
towards my preferred regime, but here it is.  There is a powerful case based on a liberal 
conception of negative liberty that would grant citizens the right to consume whatever 
substances they wish as long as they internalize foreseeable externalities through 
insurance or other means.  I fully recognize that decriminalization would be fraught and 
unpredictable and that the dangers may be great (MacCoun and Reuter 2011), but the 
risks are worth taking in the name of liberty.  Even if the law did not decriminalize drugs, 
no one should be prosecuted for possession of small amounts of any drug for personal 
use.  The moral and political arguments for the right to consume what a competent adult 
chooses are too powerful (e.g., Husak 1992, 2002). 
The second ground is consequential.  The “war on drugs” in the United States is 
such an abject failure that I am willing to take the risk to reduce the overall harms to 
individuals and to society at large.  I do not base this position on the success of other 
places, such as British Columbia or Portugal, in moving towards decriminalization 
without catastrophe striking.  The United States is simply too different.  Rather, my view 
is based on the observation that the strongly moralistic view towards drug consumption 
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prevents our society from recognizing that the regime of criminalization produces vast 
costs.  Harm would be substantially reduced in a decriminalized system.  Possession 
would not be a crime and the cost of drugs would be sufficiently low so that addicts 
would not have to commit crimes other than possession to support their habit.  If they 
committed crimes while intoxicated, the usual rules would apply with no unfairness.  The 
vast sums now spent on law enforcement could be used to support research and 
treatment.  The money would be far better spent in this way. 
Finally, I believe that the substantive law of criminal responsibility is too harsh.  
In particular, there is no generic mitigating doctrine that would apply to all defendants 
who might have substantial rationality or self-control problems that do not warrant a 
complete excuse.  Taking such problems into account if largely limited to sentencing and 
is thus discretionary.  Assuming that the problem of diachronous responsibility could be 
finessed generally or did not obtain in particular cases, many addicts might qualify for 
such mitigation.  I have proposed such a doctrine (Morse 2003) and believe that the 
problem of diachronous responsibility might not loom so large if defendants were simply 
seeking mitigation and not a full excuse. 
In short, the current criminal law response to drugs and addiction is defensible, 
but it is far from optimum. 
Conclusion 
 Current Anglo-American law concerning addiction is most consistent with the 
choice model of addictive behavior and the no-choice model has made few inroads 
despite the enormous advances in the psychological, genetic and neuroscientific 
understanding of addiction.  The law’s conservatism is defensible, even in the face of the  
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chronic and relapsing brain disease model of addiction, which often unjustifiably assumes 
that addicts have essentially no choice about use and other crimes committed to support 
use.  Nevertheless, sound legal policy should move away from a primarily criminal law 
response and should move towards a more liberal regime based on rights and good 
overall consequences. 
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